REASSESS PIVOT STRATEGY

“The China-Iran relationship fundamentally changes in around 1993-1994, for one very significant reason. China at that time becomes a net oil importer. And China starts to meet its growing energy needs because reform and development is taking off. China starts importing oil from the region. And Iran becomes one of its principal energy sources very, very significantly.”

“What's happening is the Chinese are becoming a source of premature deindustrialization for economies in the region. In particular, the auto sector in Thailand, apparel, textiles, and steel in Indonesia, e-commerce in Vietnam. Because the Chinese are just flooding these markets with exports, as a way to keep their manufacturing economy alive.”

“I think we are, in real time, getting a stress test of the crinks and of the no limits relationship between China and Russia. And based on what you said, what I'm seeing, I think we could say a couple things for now, and tell me if you disagree, but for Beijing, Russia's power is an essential part of their grand strategy for the overall balance of power. Iran, less so, clearly less so.”

“When you think about the big political issues in the Middle East, it's the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the Iranian nuclear issue. The Chinese were marginal bit players in both. When I was at the NSC, Mike, I was tangential to the JCPOA talks, and occasionally, the negotiators would come to us and ask us, the Chinese are doing this, the Chinese are doing that, but the Chinese didn't really drive anything.”

“So what you've seen is Beijing's strategy of basically protecting its larger equities in the Gulf, preserving leverage over Tehran, depending on what happens in the future, and avoiding confrontation with Washington. ... Shifting from solidarity with Iran to de-escalation pressure, to me is really, really, really interesting.”

“The US shock is the fact that A, they see the US self-marginalizing. Through its withdrawal from international institutions, the WTO global trading system, its criticism of European allies, the criticism of NATO, and then just the sort of hyper-transactualism of Trump. And that has generated a degree of uncertainty and reliability.”

“The pivot was an expression of a strategic intention and aspiration that was knowingly done that it would take time to achieve, right? And the US strategy in Asia has as its core forward deployed forces, substantial amounts of them. 28,000 in South Korea at its peak, about 50,000 in Japan. Those numbers have not come down in any significant way.”

“To me, on the energy security question, the key issue is the debate about energy security in Asia only about price and as a result, a macroeconomic issue that central banks and finance ministers manage or does it become about access to quantity? ... So that interestingly could be a strategic bank shot for the United States where energy security becomes higher on the national interest list and the United States because of its energy independence actually it creates a new foundation for pulling the allies and partners in the region close.”