Greg Brew on Surging Energy and the 'Strategic Trap' of the War in Iran

“But this war, this attack was interpreted by Iran as a threat to its survival, a threat to the regime's survival, and it responded in a way that it has been saying it would respond for a long time. So I have been shocked, but if I were a better Iran and energy analyst, maybe I shouldn't have been.”

“But the collective understanding of the war initially was that it was going to be a short war because The United States and because president Donald Trump didn't want a long war. So there was this belief that, okay, things are bad. Iran has been attacked. It's being heavily bombed by The US and Israel. It's closing the Strait Of Hormuz. But Trump is gonna deescalate and it's gonna end. That's part of the reason why oil prices didn't really respond as aggressively initially as I think they've responded since.”

“I think it comes down to in this context, he is maybe more conscious of looking weak than taking the taco and taking the the the short term win and seeing the economic indicators, the financial indicators swing back in his favor. If he does back down right now, it feeds directly into the Iranians' narrative of victory. This sense that Iran is tougher, more resilient, more able to withstand pain, and that eventually they will outlast not only The United States, but more specifically The US president.”

“Going into this, there was a belief in the administration and perhaps a belief from the president himself that there was an opportunity in Iran to replicate the experience in Venezuela. That there was a way to kill Ali Khamenei, the supreme leader, and that in the wake of his death, a group of Iranian leaders would come to the fore and would pursue policies that aligned with US interests. Now the problem, which they encountered immediately, was that the individuals they expected to lead that political shift inside Iran were also killed alongside Ali Khamenei in the opening hours of the war.”

“There's overwhelming evidence to suggest that most Iranians don't support most of the policies that the regime pursues. The other aspect of this and, you know, this is it's not a uniquely Iranian story. Decades of repression and, you know, monitoring, political dissent, restricting the political environment. What that means is that there's really no organized political opposition inside Iran. There's no, you know, opposition candidate or opposition leader who's, you know, fighting the good fight.”

“The Iranians are trying to show the GCC states and particularly The UAE your model of economic development, this idea that you can turn The Gulf into an island of stability with tourism, with finance, with tech, with hotels, all of that will go away if we keep being attacked. The second reason they're doing this is they are indicating to the GCC that their relationship with The United States is untenable. That so long as they allow The US to have bases in the region, so long as they allow The US to support their security, that from the point of view of Iran, they are US allies, they are US instruments, and that makes them legitimate targets.”

“The Americans, I think, assume or perhaps elements of the Trump administration assume, oh, if we take Karg, then they have to do what we say because they're gonna wanna export oil again. I think that misunderstands the, let's let's say, psychological characteristics of not only the Islamic Republic but also of the Iranian state. They will respond extremely negatively to US soldiers on Iranian soil. They would rather live under greater financial pressure and an inability to export oil in volume than to capitulate to a US pressure campaign that involves the invasion of Iranian territory.”

“I mean, Joe, you mentioned the damage done to the the Qatar facility last night. That was, I believe, one missile that got through and caused enough damage that they'll have to keep the facility off for a long time and has now cut production for years to some extent. And so that's that's one missile. And they could I think they could do more if they wanted.”

“How little the Iranians have needed to do to Hormuz to keep it shut. They've struck about a dozen tankers. They haven't sunk any as far as I know. They haven't laid more than a few mines as far as anyone is aware. Activity at Hormuz has been pretty quiet because as soon as the war began and as soon as the Iranians said Strait Of Hormuz is now closed, all the shippers stopped. Nothing was moving. The threat was enough to keep it closed, which I thought was surprising.”

“I think seeing oil prices fall below $75 a barrel by the end of the year is pretty unlikely, even if this conflict wraps up very quickly. When we entered 2026, there was this broad expectation that this was gonna be a pretty soft market, that there was going to be an imbalance in supply over demand. That has all changed now. The size of the physical disruption that we've seen so far is gonna create constraints on supply going through the next twelve months.”