βYou're absolutely correct that the fiscal deficits seem to be stuck at between 5 and 6 percent of GDP. You and I early in our career spent time at Treasury, and in our day, that would have been a real eye-popping number in an economic expansion. Basically, anything over two or three is something you would get focused on.β
Soft landing disinflation succeeded through late 2024
βHistorically, in order to reduce core inflation by multiple percentage points, you need a deep recession. I believe there are some very prominent economists who said to get inflation down to the 2s, youβre going to need 6% unemployment. And of course, through the end of 2024, that had not happened. Inflation had fallen, I think it bottomed at 2.4%.β
βSo I think the story in the US in 2025, to some extent, was tariffs pushing up the price of goods. And that was offset by a decline in services inflation. And then, of course, in 2026, we have a sharp increase in global energy, oil and natural gas prices due to the hostilities in the Middle East and the closure of the Strait of Hormuz.β
βAnd then, of course, in 2026, we have a sharp increase in global energy, oil and natural gas prices due to the hostilities in the Middle East and the closure of the Strait of Hormuz. And so certainly that is a non-monetary policy shock this year.β
βI attribute most of that to higher-term premium that bond markets require to hold sovereign bonds. During my time at the Treasury, even before the pandemic, when the Pal FED was hiking rates, I think 10-year Treasury yields peaked at around 3 percent, and they're now running, of course, in the mid-4s, and indeed, they've been averaging, I think, four and a quarter for the last several years.β